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Abstract
Sponsored search mechanisms have drawn much attention from both academic community
and industry in recent years since the seminal papers of [13] and [14]. However, most of the
existing literature concentrates on the mechanism design and analysis within the scope of
only one search engine in the market. In this paper we propose a mathematical framework
for modeling the interaction of publishers, advertisers and end users in a competitive market.
We first consider the monopoly market model and provide optimal solutions for both ex ante
and ex post cases, which represents the long-term and short-term revenues of search engines
respectively. We then analyze the strategic behaviors of end users and advertisers under
duopoly and prove the existence of equilibrium for both search engines to co-exist from ex-
post perspective. To show the more general ex ante results, we carry out extensive simulations
under different parameter settings. Our analysis and observation in this work can provide useful
insight in regulating the sponsored search market and protecting the interests of advertisers
and end users.
1 Introduction
Internet advertising has become a main source of revenue for primary search engines nowadays.
According to the newly-released report by Interactive Advertising Bureau and PricewaterhouseC-
oopers [1], Internet advertising in the United States reached $22.7 billion in total revenue for the
full year of 2009, where sponsored search revenue accounted for 47 percent of the total revenue.
A typical Internet search market consists of three parties: publishers (i.e., search engines),
advertisers and end users. In the current age of information explosion, more and more people rely
on search engines to pin down their favored products or services. Whenever a query is submitted
to the engines by end users, their intents or interests can be potentially captured by the engines
through the inputted keywords. These intents of search users can then be sold by search engines
to companies who are interested in targeting their products to these users. Nowadays, major
search engine operators like Google, Yahoo! and Microsoft display advertisements in the form of
sponsored links, which appears alongside the algorithmic links (also known as organic links) in the
search results pages. For each keyword, there are usually more than one available advertising slot
in the search engine results page. How to effectively allocate these slots and charge the advertisers
have been studied and discussed extensively in recent years among people in both academia and
industry. Take Google’s AdWords program for example. In this advertising program, advertisers
could choose multiple keywords they are interested in, and for each keyword indicate the maximal
willingness to pay for each click and the budget to spend over a period of time. Whenever a user
clicks on the sponsored link and is re-directed to the advertisers’ site, certain payment is charged
by the program until the advertisers’ budget is used up.
Most of the existing works focus on the interaction of the three parties within the scope of
only one search engine’s advertising system, and these results and suggestions from researchers did
greatly improve the efficiency of mechanism held in major search engine companies. For example,
the transition from generalized first price auction to generalized second price auction, from payment
per impression to payment per click, from bid-based ranking to quality-based ranking and so on
[2, 6]. However, considering there is usually more than one company providing search service in the
market, one natural question would be how the market would evolve when there exists competition
between multiple search engines. In particular, will all users and advertisers gradually concentrate to
one leading engine or will the “inferior” engines still earn enough profits to survive when competing
with the leading one? What would be the consequences if one search engine monopolizes the
market? Should governments take anti-trust action against potential cooperation among major
search engines? These concerns arise from the current situation of high levels of concentration in
search engine market: Google is widely considered to possess the leading technology and obtain the
largest market shares in most countries and regions, followed by Yahoo! and Microsoft Bing.
This paper aims to formulate a reasonable model to study the competition between two search
engine operators and help to address some of the intriguing questions mentioned above. We will
consider a three-stage dynamic game model. In stage I, the two operators’ services determine how
the market of end users is split. In stage II, the two operators simultaneously determine their prices
to advertisers. In stage III, the advertisers choose the operator in which they can obtain highest
utility based on the announced prices in stage II. Each operator wants to maximize its revenue
subject to the competition for advertisers from the other operator.
The key contributions of the paper are:
• To the best of our knowledge, this paper is among the first to model the comprehensive
interaction of heterogenous publishers, advertisers and users in a competitive environment.
We elaborate the whole process of search engine competition in attracting both users and
advertisers. The technical details applied in practical advertising systems, such as the values
and budgets of advertisers, are taken into consideration explicitly in our formulation.
• We prove the existence of Nash Equilibrium prices when allowing advertisers participate in
both advertising systems simultaneously. Moreover, we show the comparative results between
the equilibrium prices and monopoly price when only one search engine exists in the market.
• We propose two distinct points of view, i.e., the ex ante view and the ex post view, to inspect
the long-term and short-term revenues of search engines respectively. Furthermore, for the
ex post case, we present the detailed algorithm for calculating the exact allocation results for
advertisers. For the ex ante case, we can carry out the simulations to illustrate the comparative
results of expected revenues and social welfare under competition and monopoly respectively.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the related work. Section 3 formulates
the monopoly model and provides solutions for both the ex ante and ex post cases. Based on
the monopoly formulation, we analyze the strategic behaviors of end users and advertisers under
2
duopoly and find the Nash Equilibrium prices of both search engines in Section 4. In Section 5 we
compare the results under competition and monopoly via simulation and reveal various factors that
affect the revenues and social welfare. We conclude in Section 6 and outline some future research
directions.
2 Related Work
There are mainly two lines of research work in the sponsored search area. The mainstream of
literature focuses on the interaction between advertisers and search engines and aims to understand
and devise viable mechanism for the Internet advertising market. There is significant work on
the auction mechanism held by major search engines, starting from two seminal works of [13]
and [14] which independently investigated the “generalized second-price” (GSP) auction prevailing
in major search engines such as Google and Yahoo!. In [20] the authors compared the “direct
ranking” method by Overture with the “revenue ranking” method by Google and proposed a truthful
mechanism named as “laddered auction”. Considering the non-strategyproofness property of GSP
mechanism, [21] analyzed one prevalent strategy of advertisers called “vindictive bidding” in real-
world keyword auction. [26] and [27] relaxed the basic assumption of separable click-through rate
in [20] and modeled the externality effect among advertisements which appeared in the same search
page simultaneously. [28] proposed a new valuation model to absorb the adverse effect of the
competing advertisements on the advertiser’s value per click. There is also an abundance of works
on proposing more expressive but still scalable mechanism for sponsored search such as [24, 25, 23,
29, 22]. In particular, in [29] the advertisers were allowed to submit a two-dimensional bid (b, b′)
where b was the bid for exclusive display and b′ for sharing slots with other advertisements. In
[22] the authors proposed a truthful hybrid auctions where advertisers can make a per-impression
as well as per-click bid and showed that it can generate higher revenue for search engine compared
with the pure per-click scheme.
It’s worth pointing out that a few works considered the practical situation where similar key-
word auctions are held simultaneously by multiple search engines. For example, in [15] the authors
investigated the revenue properties of two search engines with different click-through rates which
competed for the same set of advertisers. The study in [16] considered competition between two
search engines which differs in their ranking rules: one applied the direct ranking method we men-
tioned above, and the other applied the revenue ranking method.1 We assert that this assumption
of search engine difference is unrealistic since major engines tend to use the same policy which
proves to work efficiently in practice and it is unlikely that certain engine would switch back to the
obsolete rules.2 The Nash equilibrium solution in the former paper of [15] is also not so practical
since it requires advertisers to adopt certain randomized strategy. It’s very difficult for individual
advertisers to implement such complex strategies which would incur unnecessary maintenance cost.
The other line of work is developed mainly by economists to address the broad issues of search
engine competition from social welfare perspective. [4] introduced a quality choice game model
where end users choose the search engine with highest quality of search results, and showed that no
1In the original paper of [16], the authors used the terms of “price-only ranking rule” and “quality-adjusted
ranking rule” which has the same meaning.
2One typical example is that, in May 2002 Google first introduced the revenue ranking approach which proved to
be more efficient. And then in 2007, Yahoo! switched from prior direct ranking to revenue ranking rule similar to
Google’s [2].
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Nash equilibrium exists in this game. Based on this proposition, the author argues that the search
engine market would evolve towards monopoly in the absence of necessary regulatory interventions.
[5] proposed a duopoly model which has some similarity to our formulation, however, as many of
the technical details of the practical advertising system are ignored, it is doubtful whether this can
serve as an accurate model to predict the outcome of search engine market. Similarly, [4] faces
the same problem that the vague description of participants’ utility may not be strong enough to
support the predictive conclusions in the paper.
These two lines of important work have little intersections so far: the mainstream of work
concentrates on the technical progress in designing “better” advertising system, and the other line
usually involves less technical details (like the budgets of advertisers in practical advertising system)
and targets the macro-effect of competitive market. In view of this, we believe that a comprehensive
study of the current search engine ecosystem in a competitive way is vital for addressing many of
the unresolved issues in this thriving market. Our work manages to narrow the gap between these
two directions of research and makes some initial progress in this direction. This observation helps
differentiate our work from most of the existing literature.
3 The Monopoly Market Model
In this section we consider the monopoly market first, which serves as a starting point for analyzing
the more general competition market. Suppose there is only one search engine in the market
servicing a fixed set of end users and providing advertising opportunity for a set of advertisers
denoted by I (|I| = m). Assuming all users are homogeneous and each of them tends to generate
the same number of impressions (or clicks) for a particular keyword (query). Since we assumes
that the search engine owns a fixed number of users, it would be able to supply a fixed number of
attentions (in the form of impressions or clicks) for advertisers. For a given interval, let the supply
of attentions be S. Each advertiser i ∈ I has two private parameters: value vi denoting i’s maximal
willingness to pay for each attention and budget Bi in a given time interval (could be daily, weekly,
monthly budget and so on). The search engine needs to determine the optimal price per attention
to maximize its revenue3:
R = p ·min(S,D(p)) = min(p · S, pD(p))
where D(p) is the demand function over price p.
In the following analysis we consider this revenue maximization problem in two different per-
spectives: the ex ante perspective where the search engine only has an rough estimation to the
parameters of participating advertisers, and the ex post perspective where the engine just needs to
make decision based on the submitted parameters of advertisers. Although in practice, the advertis-
ing systems do determine the prices only after advertisers have submitted their values and budgets,
we assert that the ex ante view of revenue to be a natural fit for the search engine’s objective.
This is because typically the interaction between search engine and advertisers is not one-shot and
would usually last for many rounds. Advertisers can actually adjust their submitted parameters
3In practice, the optimal price is usually determined automatically by an auction mechanism. Specifically, this
automation process can be imagined as an ascending-bid auction [3] where the auctioneer (i.e., the search engine)
iteratively raises the price until there is no excessive demand than supply. Considering strategic issues, [19] pro-
poses an asymptotically revenue-maximizing truthful mechanism. For simplicity of analysis, we ignore the detailed
implementation of auctions and assume the search engine can solve the revenue-maximizing problem instantaneously.
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at any time to achieve better payoff. Thus the ex ante result could provide valuable prediction of
the long-term revenue for the search engine, rather than the short-term profit from one particular
instance of the ex post case.
3.1 Ex ante case
Assuming the search engine can have a rough estimation of the distribution of advertisers’ values
and budgets. For simplicity, we only consider the scenario when the parameters are independent and
identically-distributed random variables. To be specific, suppose values are drawn independently
from distribution with density function f(v) and CDF F (v) over the range of [v, v], and budgets
are drawn independently from distribution with density function g(B) and CDF G(B).
After search engine announce the uniform price p, advertiser i would make the deal if only the
value vi is larger than p. The quantity advertiser i could purchase is constrained by the budget Bi.
Therefore the expected aggregate demand under price p from all advertisers would be:
D(p) =
∑
i∈I
E(Bi)
p
· Prob{vi > p} = m ·
E(B)
p
[1− F (p)]
Rewrite it as:
p ·D(p) = m ·E(B) · [1− F (p)] (1)
which is a non-increasing function over p.
We can use figure 1 to illustrate the revenue of search engine over price p.
p¤ p
p ¢ Sp ¢D(p)
0
Figure 1: Search Engine Revenue Over Prices (Ex Ante)
Proposition 1. The revenue R is maximized when S = D(p), i.e., when the demand equals the
supply.
Proposition 1 can be proved by contradiction. If supply exceeds demand under the current
price, the search engine will cut down the price to achieve higher revenue (since R = p · D(p) is
non-increasing over price p); if demand exceeds supply, the search engine can raise the price and
reach a higher revenue (since R = p · S is monotonically increasing over price p).
Example 1. Assuming vi is drawn from uniform distribution with positive support on the interval
[v, v], where 0 ≤ v < v and ∆v = v − v. Then 1− F (p) = v−p
∆v
. From S = D(p) we have:
p∗ =
m · E(B) · v
m · E(B) + S ·∆v
The intuition is that the more demand (larger m) there is, the higher market clearing price
would be; and the more supply (larger S) there is, the lower market clearing price is.
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3.2 Ex post case
In practical search engine advertising system, advertisers need to submit their values and budgets
to the advertising system. The search engine therefore could determine the optimal price based on
the ex post variables.
Reorder the index of advertisers such that vj ≤ vj+1, j = 1, . . . , m − 1. Then the aggregate
demand can be written as:
D(p) =
∑
i∈I+(p)
Bi
p
where we define the set:
I+(p) , {i ∈ I : vi > p}
Thus p · D(p) =
∑
i∈I+(p)Bi is a non-increasing function over p since I
+(p) shrinks as price p
increases. By letting demand equal to supply, we have
p(I) =
∑
i∈I+(p)Bi
S
Notice that the term of price appears in both sides of the equation. Thus in general we cannot
derive the closed-form solution for optimal price. Since pD(p) is piece-wise constant and (weakly)
decreasing over p, we can illustrate the search engine revenue through examples in figure 2. Here we
assume there are four advertisers ordered such that v1 ≤ v2 ≤ v3 ≤ v4 and initially when the price
is zero, I+(p) = I = {1, 2, 3, 4}. As the price exceeds v1, advertiser 1 would have no incentive to
stay and I+(p) becomes {2, 3, 4}. The crossing point of demand and supply shows that the optimal
price p∗ is located in [v1, v2]. To be more exact, p
∗(I) = (B2+B3+B4)/S. In figure 2b we also show
the other case when there is one advertiser who is indifferent between participating and quitting
the ad campaign since the optimal price is equal to its value. In typical search engine systems like
Google AdWords, after advertisers input their maximal willingness to pay (i.e., their values) and
budgets, the ad system would automatically allocate attentions to advertisers as long as the current
price doesn’t exceed their values and the budgets have not been exhausted yet. Thus here for ease
of expression we can assume that the indifferent advertiser would continue participating in the ad
campaign under the budget constraint. For example, as shown in figure 2b, the optimal price is
equal to v2 (satisfying B3 +B4 < v2S < B2 +B3 +B4), advertiser 2 would consume the remaining
supply of S − B3+B4
v2
and only spent v2S −B3 − B4 which is less than its budget B2.
p¤ p
p ¢ S
0 v1 v2 v3 v4
p ¢D(p)
(a) Determined Advertisers
p¤
p
p ¢ S
p ¢D(p)
0 v1 v2 v3 v4
(b) Undetermined Advertiser
Figure 2: Search Engine Revenue Over Prices (Ex Post)
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We can now show a polynomial step algorithm for search engine to compute the optimal price.
By inputting the parameters of advertisers (assuming the indexes of advertisers are re-ordered such
that vi ≤ vi+1, i ∈ {1, . . . , m− 1}), algorithm 1 would return the value of optimal price. The time
complexity of the algorithm is O(m2) where m is the number of advertisers4.
Algorithm 1 Calculate Optimal Price p∗(I)
Begin
1: v0 = 0;
2: for i = 1 : m
3: sum = 0;
4: for j = i : m
5: sum+ = Bj ;
6: end for;
7: p = sum/S;
8: if (p ≤ vi)
9: return max(p, vi−1);
10: end if ;
11: end for;
12: return vm;
End
After determining the optimal price p∗, the quantity of attentions allocated to each advertiser i,
denoted by qi, can be easily computed. The search engine would first find the least index of advertiser
whose value is larger than or equal to p∗, which is denoted by j ∈ {i ∈ I : vi ≥ p
∗, vi−1 < p
∗}
(we define v0 = 0). If there are no undetermined advertisers, which implies vj > p
∗, the quantity
allocated to advertiser i would be qi = Bi/p
∗ for i ≥ j and qi = 0 otherwise. If undetermined
advertiser does exist, which implies vj = p
∗, we have qi = Bi/p
∗ for i > j, qj = S −
∑m
i=j+1 qi,
and qi = 0 for i < j. In both cases, the demand equals the supply, i.e.,
∑
i∈I qi = S. This can be
summarized in algorithm 2.
The revenue of search engine is:
R = p∗ · S (2)
The aggregate utility of advertisers is:
UA =
∑
i∈I+(p∗)
(vi − p
∗)
Bi
p∗
(3)
Notice that the indifferent advertiser, if exists, would always achieve zero utility since the current
price equals its value, thus we don’t need to consider it in the expression.
The social welfare of the advertising system5 is:
SW = R + UA (4)
4The time complexity of the algorithm may be further reduced to O(m) by computing and saving the value of
sumi ,
∑
j∈{i,...,m}Bj , i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} first, which can be finished in O(m) steps. Then the inner “for” loop in
algorithm 1 can be substituted by the stored value of sumi and the complexity of the algorithm is reduced to O(m).
Here for simplicity of exposition, we just show the O(m2) algorithm.
5We don’t consider search users’ utility in the expression here.
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Algorithm 2 Calculate Allocation qi, i ∈ I
Begin
1: sum = 0;
2: p = p∗;
3: for j = 1 : m
4: if (vj ≥ p)
5: break;
6: end if ;
7: end for;
8: for i = 1 : (j − 1)
9: qi = 0;
10: end for;
11: for i = (j + 1) : m
12: qi = Bi/p;
13: sum+ = qi;
14: end for;
15: qj = S − sum;
End
Lemma 1. The optimal price is non-decreasing over the set of participating advertisers given fixed
supply S. That is to say, for any advertisers set I1 and I2, if I1 ⊆ I2, we have p
∗(I1) ≤ p
∗(I2),
where p∗(I) is obtained according to algorithm 1.
Proof. We can prove the above lemma by contradiction. For simplicity of notation, we write p1 ,
p∗(I1) and p2 , p
∗(I2) and assume that p1 > p2.
Since under optimal price, supply must be equal to demand, we have:
S =
∑
i∈I+
1
(p1)
Bi
p1
+
αBl
p1
and S =
∑
i∈I+
2
(p2)
Bi
p2
+
βBl′
p2
where α ∈ [0, 1], and α > 0 if and only if there exists an indifferent advertiser l whose value vl equals
p1; Similarly, β ∈ [0, 1], and β > 0 if and only if there exists an advertiser l
′ such that vl′ = p2.
For any advertiser i ∈ I+1 (p1), we have i ∈ I1 ⊆ I2 and vi > p1 > p2, thus i ∈ I
+
2 (p2), which
infers that I+1 (p1) ⊆ I
+
2 (p2); since vl = p1 > p2, we also have l ∈ I
+
2 (p2). Therefore,
S =
∑
i∈I+
1
(p1)
Bi
p1
+
αBl
p1
≤
∑
i∈I+
1
(p1)
Bi
p1
+
Bl
p1
≤
∑
i∈I+
2
(p2)
Bi
p1
<
∑
i∈I+
2
(p2)
Bi
p2
≤
∑
i∈I+
2
(p2)
Bi
p2
+
βBl′
p2
Contradiction to the conclusion that supply should equal demand under optimal price p2.
Lemma 2. The revenue of search engine is non-decreasing over the set of participating advertisers
given fixed supply S. That is to say, for any advertisers set I1 and I2, if I1 ⊆ I2, we have
R(I1) ≤ R(I2).
Proof. This conclusion can be deducted from lemma 1 immediately:
R(I1) = p
∗(I1) · S ≤ p
∗(I2) · S ≤ R(I2).
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Lemma 3. The optimal price is non-increasing over the supply given the set of participating ad-
vertisers I. That is to say, for any supply S1, S2 ∈ [0,∞), if S1 > S2, we have p
∗(S1) ≤ p
∗(S2).
Proof. We prove the lemma by contradiction. For simplicity, we write p1 , p
∗(S1) and p2 , p
∗(S2)
and assume that p1 > p2.
Since under optimal price, supply equals demand, we get:
S1 =
∑
i∈I+(p1)
Bi
p1
+
αBl
p1
and S2 =
∑
i∈I+(p2)
Bi
p2
+
βBl′
p2
where α ∈ [0, 1], and α > 0 if and only if there exists an indifferent advertiser l whose value vl equals
p1; Similarly, β ∈ [0, 1], and β > 0 if and only if there exists an advertiser l
′ such that vl′ = p2.
For any advertiser i ∈ I+(p1), we have vi > p1 > p2, thus i ∈ I
+(p2), which infers that
I+(p1) ⊆ I
+(p2); since vl = p1 > p2, we also have l ∈ I
+(p2). Therefore,
S1 =
∑
i∈I+(p1)
Bi
p1
+
αBl
p1
≤
∑
i∈I+(p1)
Bi
p1
+
Bl
p1
≤
∑
i∈I+(p2)
Bi
p1
<
∑
i∈I+(p2)
Bi
p2
≤
∑
i∈I+(p2)
Bi
p2
+
βBl′
p2
= S2
Contradiction to our assumption of S1 > S2.
Lemma 4. The revenue of search engine is non-decreasing over the supply given the set of par-
ticipating advertisers I. That is to say, for any supply S1, S2 ∈ [0,∞), if S1 > S2, we have
R(S1) ≥ R(S2).
Proof. For simplicity, we write p1 , p
∗(S1) and p2 , p
∗(S2) and from lemma 3 we know that
p1 < p2.
Since under optimal price, supply equals demand, we get:
S1 =
∑
i∈I+(p1)
Bi
p1
+
αBl
p1
and S2 =
∑
i∈I+(p2)
Bi
p2
+
βBl′
p2
where α ∈ [0, 1], and α > 0 if and only if there exists an indifferent advertiser l whose value vl equals
p1; Similarly, β ∈ [0, 1], and β > 0 if and only if there exists an advertiser l
′ such that vl′ = p2.
For any advertiser i ∈ I+(p2), we have vi > p2 > p1, thus i ∈ I
+(p1), which infers that
I+(p2) ⊆ I
+(p1); since vl′ = p2 > p1, we also have l
′ ∈ I+(p1). Therefore,
R(S2) = p2 · S2 =
∑
i∈I+(p2)
Bi + βBl′ ≤
∑
i∈I+(p2)
Bi +Bl′ ≤
∑
i∈I+(p1)
Bi ≤
∑
i∈I+(p1)
Bi + αBl = R(S1)
3.3 Formulated As An Optimization Problem
The revenue maximization problem confronting the monopolistic search engine could also be inter-
preted as an optimization problem as follows:
maximize p ·
∑
i
qi (5)
subject to ∀i ∈ I : p · qi ≤ Bi (6)
∀i ∈ I : (vi − p) · qi ≥ 0 (7)∑
i
qi ≤ S (8)
∀i ∈ I : p, qi ≥ 0 (9)
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where the search engine needs to determine its optimal price p and allocation of supply qi to each
advertiser i in objective function 5. Constraint (6) means that each advertiser could not spend more
than its budget. Constraint (7) shows that the utility of advertiser must be non-negative, i.e., when
the price p exceeds the value vi, which implies that qi must be zero, advertiser i would just quit the
ad campaign. The total supply to all advertisers is limited by S, which is shown in constraint (8).
The last constraint states that all variables (p and qi, i ∈ I) should be non-negative.
As we have shown in proposition 1 that the maximal revenue can only be obtained when supply
equals demand, therefore the above formulation may be further reduced to:
maximize p · S (10)
subject to ∀i ∈ I : p · qi ≤ Bi (11)
∀i ∈ I : (vi − p) · qi ≥ 0 (12)∑
i
qi = S (13)
∀i ∈ I : p, qi ≥ 0 (14)
where constraint (13) becomes tight and the objective function is simplified to maximize variable p
only. Thus it’s easy to see that the optimal solution for p is unique. Otherwise, if both p∗ and p∗′
maximize the objective function, it must be p∗ · S = p∗′ · S, so p∗ = p∗′. It remains to be inspected
whether the optimal allocation vector of ~q , (q1, q2, . . . , qm) for the optimization problem is unique
too. We summarize our conclusions in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. In general, for revenue maximization problem (10), the optimal price p is unique,
however, there may be multiple optimal solutions for allocation vector ~p.
This can be shown by constructing a simple example as follows: there are two advertisers with
v1 = 1, v2 = 2 and B1 = 2, B2 = 1, search engine’s supply is S = 2. Assuming the optimal price p
∗
is larger than 1, q1 must be zero since v1 < p
∗, then q2 must be 2 according to constraint (13). This
would lead to p · q2 > 2, which contradicts with the budget constraint of B2 = 1. Now assuming the
optimal price p∗ = 1, the constraints of the optimization problem would be reduced to q1 + q2 = 2
and q2 ≤ 1, thus the optimal allocation vector could be ~q∗ = (q
∗
1, q
∗
2) = (2− q, q), ∀q ∈ [0, 1].
We now turn to investigate the effect of different optimal solutions to the social welfare. Since in
general R = p ·
∑
i∈I qi and UA =
∑
i∈I(vi−p)qi, from equation (4) we get SW =
∑
i∈I vi · qi, where
the payments between search engine and advertiser are crossed off. If we examine the original social
welfare maximization (SWM) problem under the same constraints (11)-(14), we can immediately
present a trivial solution as follows: p = 0, qm = S, qi = 0 for i ∈ I\{m}, i.e., letting the advertiser
with the highest value acquire all the supply exclusively. Now the maximal social welfare would
be SWmax = vm · S. However, this solution is infeasible since it induces zero profit to the search
engine. An alternative problem the search engine may be interested in is to maximize the social
welfare while maintaining the optimal revenue it has achieved in (10). In other words, we need to
pick out one among the multiple optimal allocations of (10) to maximize the social welfare. We
call it as the constrained social welfare maximization (C-SWM) problem henceforth. This following
theorem gives the solution to the C-SWM problem.
Theorem 1. Among all optimal solutions to the profit maximization problem (10), algorithm 1 and
2 yield the one which maximizes the social welfare, i.e., the solution to the constrained social welfare
maximization (C-SWM) problem.
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Proof. Denote the optimal price and allocation induced by algorithms as p∗ and q∗1, . . . , q
∗
m, and
assuming there is another allocation vector qˆ1, . . . , qˆm satisfying the constraints (11)-(14). Assuming
advertiser j has the cutting-off value such that vi ≥ p
∗ for i ≥ j and vi < p
∗ for i < j. Therefore
from constraint (12), we must have q∗i = qˆi = 0 for all i < j. According to algorithm 2, q
∗
i =
Bi
p∗
for
all i > j and q∗j = S −
∑m
i=j+1 qi. Due to the constraint (12), for all i > j, it must be qˆi ≤
Bi
p∗
= q∗i .
Hence we can assume that qˆi = q
∗
i − δi, where δi ≥ 0 for all i > j. Then the social welfare under
either allocation is:
SW1 =
∑
i∈I
vi · q
∗
i
=
m∑
i=j+1
vi · q
∗
i + vj · (S −
m∑
i=j+1
q∗i )
SW2 =
∑
i∈I
vi · qˆi
=
m∑
i=j+1
vi · (q
∗
i − δi) + vj · [S −
m∑
i=j+1
(q∗i − δi)]
= SW1 +
m∑
i=j+1
δi · (vj − vi)
Since δi ≥ 0 and vj ≤ vi for i > j, we have SW2 ≤ SW1. Therefore q
∗
1, . . . , q
∗
m maximizes the social
welfare over all possible optimal allocations of (10).
4 The Duopoly Market Model
In this section we switch from the monopoly model to the competitive model with more than one
search engine. Considering the likely situation where there is one leading search company and
one major competitor in the market (for example, Google and Yahoo! in the United States), we
describe a duopoly model where one search engine has an advantage over the other. We formulate
their competition as a three-stage dynamic game and solve it from the ex post perspective as follows.
4.1 Competition for End Users in Stage I
In Stage I search engines would choose different strategies for attracting end users with different
tastes. The user bases they attract in this Stage would be the decisive factor for determining their
supply of user attentions to advertisers in subsequent stages.
We assume that there are two horizontally and vertically differentiated search engines J = {1, 2}
providing search results to users and selling ad opportunity to advertisers.
Here horizontal difference means the different design of their home pages and diversity of extra
services such as email, news and other applications. Different users may have different tastes and
preferences and hence be attracted by different search engines.
Vertical difference means the quality of searching results. The higher the quality is, the better
users and advertisers would feel. We assume that search engine 1 possesses the leading technology
to match ads to search queries and can provide better service for both users and advertisers than
search engine 2.
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In terms of horizontal difference, the canonical Hotelling’s model of spatial competition [7]
provides an appealing framework to address the equilibrium in characteristic space. The behaviors
of providers could then be rationalized as the best-response strategies of players in a location game.
The dynamics of the game can be described as follows: each provider chooses a location in the
characteristic space which denotes the specific feature of service it provides to users. And each user
is characterized by an address reflecting his individual preference of ideal features search engines
should provide. Searching at engine j ∈ J involves quadratic transportation cost6 for a user if
engine j is not located in his ideal position. Users would choose search engine which provides better
search results and also induces as low transportation cost as possible.
Assuming that a continuum of users are spread uniformly with unit density on the circumference
of a unit circle. The address of user is denoted by t ∈ [0, 1). Without loss of generality, let search
engine 1 locate at x1 = 0
7 and search engine 2 x2 ∈ [0, 1), as shown in figure 3.
x1 = 0
x2 2 [0; 1)
»1 »2
indifferent user
Figure 3: Users in Circular Domain
Assuming search engine 1 can provide higher quality results for users than search engine 2. Then
the utility of the user searching in either engine would be as follows:
u1(t) = ζ1q − C(t, x1) = q −min{t
2, (1− t)2} (15)
u2(t) = ζ2q − C(t, x2) = ζq − (t− x2)
2 (16)
where ζ ∈ [0, 1] denotes the comparative “disability” of search engine 2 to provide the best search
result to users; q is the positive payoff users perceive when certain information is returned by the
search engine for a particular query; C(t, xj) is the transportation cost incurred when there is some
distance between user’s address t and search engine j’s location xj .
Let u1(ξ) = u2(ξ) we can find the location of users who are indifferent between searching in two
6Actually in the seminar paper of Hotelling [7] the author assumed the linear transportation cost, which resulted
in no equilibrium results. Later literatures on Hotelling’s model usually modified this assumption to the quadratic
transportation cost which ensures existence of equilibrium. Here we followed this line of revised model as applied in
recent papers such as [8, 9]. Interesting readers may further refer to the excellent survey of [10] for a comprehensive
discussion and review of different variants of the Hotelling’s model.
7Since it is a circle, engine 1 can also be regarded as locating at the ending point x1 = 1.
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engines:
ξ1 =
(1− ζ)q + x22
2x2
ξ2 =
1− x22 − (1− ζ)q
2(1− x2)
Then the market share of search engine 2 is
n2(x2) = ξ2 − ξ1 =
1
2
[1−
(1− ζ)q
x2(1− x2)
]
and search engine 1 obtains the remaining market share: n1 = 1 − n2. By applying the first-order
condition dn2
dx2
= 0, we have x∗2 =
1
2
, i.e., the maximum differentiation.
Letting x2 =
1
2
we have
n1 =
1
2
+ 2(1− ζ)q
n2 =
1
2
− 2(1− ζ)q
As we can see, when two search engines provide the same quality of service (ζ = 1), they will
divide the market share equally. The less quality search engine 2 provides, the less market share it
can hold.
Since the impression number for a particular keyword in a search engine is proportional to the
users it attracts: the more users see the advertisement, the more impressions the ad would receive
in general. To be aligned with the monopoly case in previous section, here we assume the total
supply is still S and the supply of each search engine is denoted by:
S1 = S ·
n1
n1 + n2
= S · n1
S2 = S ·
n2
n1 + n2
= S · n2
Since n1 ≥ n2, we have also S1 ≥ S2.
4.2 Competition for Advertisers in Stage II and III
Search engines compete for advertisers in the last two stages to maximize their revenues subject to
the supply constraint (S1, S2) determined in Stage I. In Stage II, search engines determine their
optimal prices (p1, p2) for charging advertisers; and consequently in Stage III, advertisers would
choose their favorite search engine for advertisements based on the previously announced prices.
Facing the new advertiser sets in Stage III, search engines may want to revert to the second stage
and revise their optimal prices, and consequently, advertisers would make necessary adjustment in
the third stage. Therefore, Stage II and III would alternate dynamically until it reaches certain
stable state. we will discuss this dynamic process in details in the following section.
For advertiser i ∈ I, the utility of participating in the ad campaign in either search engine is:
πi1 = max{(vi − p1)
Bi
p1
, 0} (17)
πi2 = max{(viρi − p2)
Bi
p2
, 0} (18)
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where ρi ∈ [0, 1] is called discount factor denoting advertiser i’s perceived “disability” of search
engine 2 to convert the impressions to clicks (or sales of products). We assume that search engine
1 owns better technology and is able to match users’ interest with the most suitable ads, hence can
generate a higher click-through rate (users’ probability of clicking after seeing the ads) or conversion
rate (users’ probability of purchase the product or service after clicking the ads) than search engine 2.
So in general advertisers would evaluate each impression in search engine 1 higher than in engine 2.
For simplicity of notation, we have normalized the discount factor of per-impression value in search
engine 1 as unity. In practical market, advertisers can be roughly classified into two categories: brand
advertisers and performance advertisers [11]. Brand advertisers usually have higher ρ since they
aim to promote the brand awareness among users and hence the relative technology disadvantage
in search engine 2 would have less effect on their values for each attention/impression. However, for
performance advertisers who care more on the click-through rate or conversion rate, the technology
disadvantage would affect their values for each impression more and therefore result in lower values
of ρ. To be more exact, we let the expectation E(ρ) of discount factor serve as the cutting-off value
for two types of advertisers, i.e., advertisers with higher ρ than E(ρ) is defined as brand advertisers
and the others are performance advertisers in our model.
By letting πi1 ≥ π
i
2 we can derive the condition under which advertiser i would choose search
engine 1:
ρi ≤
p2
p1
Assuming that advertisers are re-ordered according to ρi. Then the division of advertisers can
be depicted in figure 4 where I1(p1, p2) = {i ∈ I : ρi ≤
p2
p1
} denotes the set of advertisers who prefer
search engine 1 and I2(p1, p2) = {i ∈ I : ρi >
p2
p1
} the set of advertisers preferring engine 2.
0 1
½8½7½6½5½4½3½2½1
p2
p1I1 I2
Figure 4: The Division of Advertisers
After initial price p1 and p2 are set in the market, the advertisers set is divided into I1 and
I2. Then each search engine can compute its optimal price p
∗
1(I1) and p
∗
2(I2) independently as the
monopoly case and price ratio
p∗2(I2)
p∗
1
(I1)
gets updated. If it happens that the new price ratio divides
the advertisers set into I1 and I2, we say this is a Nash equilibrium (NE) price pair as (p
NE
1 , p
NE
2 )
and neither search engine has incentive to deviate unilaterally. Otherwise, the process will iterate
until the prices become stable.
Defining first the set of advertisers who participate the advertising campaign as follows.
I+1 (p1, p2) , {i ∈ I : ρi ≤
p2
p1
, vi ≥ p1} (19)
I+2 (p1, p2) , {i ∈ I : ρi >
p2
p1
, ρivi ≥ p2} (20)
We now give the formal definition of NE price pair.
Definition 1. A price pair of (p1, p2) is called a Nash equilibrium price pair if p1 = p
∗(I+1 (p1, p2))
and p2 = p
∗(I+2 (p1, p2)) where p
∗(I) is computed according to algorithm 1.
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It’s easy to see that under the NE price pair (p1, p2), for any advertiser i ∈ I
+
1 or i ∈ I
+
2 , it
would have no incentive to switch to the other search engine; for advertiser i ∈ I1\I
+
1 , since ρi ≤
p2
p1
and vi < p1, it holds that ρivi < p2, thus i would not switch to engine 2 which generates zero utility
according to equation (17); for advertiser i ∈ I2\I
+
2 , since ρi >
p2
p1
and ρivi < p2, we have vi < p1
so i have no incentive to switch to engine 1. Thus the NE price pair would induce a stable state to
the competition system.
Proposition 3. None-zero NE price pairs may not exist.
A simple counter-example to illustrate proposition 3 is when there is only one advertiser in the
system. No matter which search engine this advertiser chooses, the price in the other search engine
would be zero since it attracts no advertisers. Then the advertiser would have incentive to join
the other search engine due to the zero price. However, once the advertiser switches, the price in
the other search engine would become positive and price in the original engine decreases to zero.
Thus the advertiser would keep switching between two search engines and no stable prices can be
reached.
Proposition 4. If NE price pair (pNE1 , p
NE
2 ) exists, it must be p
NE
1 ≥ p
NE
2 .
Proof. Assuming pNE1 < p
NE
2 , then since
pNE2
pNE
1
> 1, we have I+2 (p1, p2) = ∅. Therefore p
NE
2 = 0
and pNE1 < 0. However, it cannot be the case since rational search engine would never set negative
prices.
Proposition 5. In the stable state, search engine 2 cannot make higher revenue than engine 1.
Proof. Since R1 = p
NE
1 ·S1 and R2 = p
NE
2 ·S2, from proposition 4 and S1 ≥ S2, it’s easy to see that
R1 ≥ R2.
Denote ν as the price ratio p2
p1
which determines advertisers’ preferences, we define the optimal
price ratio as:
f(ν) =
p∗2(I2(ν))
p∗1(I1(ν))
where p∗(I) is obtained according to algorithm 1. If the advertiser partitions generated by ν are
the same as those generated by the optimal price ratio f(ν), then the partitions are stable and the
optimal prices become NE price pair. The problem reduces to find the fixed points which satisfy
f(ν∗) = ν∗. Notice that f(ν) is piece-wise constant and its value changes at ν = ρi, i ∈ {1, . . . , m}.
From the definitions of I1 and I2 we see that as ν increases, the preferred set of I1 would
expand while I2 shrinks. According to lemma 1, we know that p
∗
1 would increase while p
∗
2 decreases.
Therefore f(ν) should be a non-increasing function of ν.
We can now show the dynamics of function f(ν) in figure 5. In this example we assume there are
five advertisers re-ordered by their values of ρ such that ρi ≤ ρi+1, i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. Similarly, there
may be two different scenarios for the location of fixed point v∗: (a) v∗ ∈ (ρi, ρi+1), i ∈ {1, . . . , m−1}
as shown in figure 5a, and (b) v∗ = ρi, i ∈ {1, . . . , m} as shown in figure 5b.
For case (a), the optimal ν∗ divides the advertisers set into exactly two subsets, and all advertisers
with strict preferences over certain search engine are aggregated to one of the subsets. The market
would become stable after each search engine sets their optimal price. For case (b), however, there
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Figure 5: Division of Advertisers Set by their Preferences
is one special advertiser who would keep switching from one search engine to the other. To illustrate
it, assuming the index of this special advertiser is l which satisfies the following condition:
p∗2({l, l + 1, . . . , m})
p∗1({1, 2, . . . , l − 1})
> ρl >
p∗2({l + 1, . . . , m})
p∗1({1, 2, . . . , l})
The first inequality above implies that advertiser l prefers search engine 1 if l has already joined
the system of search engine 2, while the second inequality implies that he would prefer engine 2
if he is associated with engine 1. Therefore, advertiser l would keep switching between two search
engines. In this case, we call advertiser l as the undetermined advertiser.
The undetermined advertiser problem arises from our assumption that advertisers can only
purchase service from one engine. This resembles the classic oscillation problem in the multi-path
routing when all traffic is aggregated to the least congested path [17]. Similar to the “splittable”
model in [18] where network users are permitted to route traffic fractionally over many paths, we
can also make the following assumption for our model:
Assumption 1. Splittable Budgets: We assume advertisers can arbitrarily split their budgets and
invest them into both search engines to maximize their utility.
Under this splittable assumption, the dynamics of undetermined advertiser l’s strategic behavior
could be interpreted as follows: assuming starting from the initial state where advertiser l has joined
engine 1, and is facing a lower price ratio (p2
p1
< ρl) which indicates him to invest more on engine 2;
then l would try to split his budget into two parts: (1− α)Bl goes to engine 1 and the rest of αBl
goes to engine 2, with α ∈ [0, 1]. As advertiser l invests more and more budgets on engine 2, i.e., α
keeps growing from zero to one, the price ratio p2
p1
would keep rising until at certain α∗ ∈ (0, 1) it
equals ρl and advertiser l would have no incentive to invest more on engine 2.
It remains to be shown whether the price ratio above would increase “smoothly”8 as α increases
and whether there always exists α∗ for the undetermined advertiser to divide his budget. We
summarize our conclusion in the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Assuming that there exists an undetermined advertiser l and this advertiser can pur-
chase service from both search engines. In particular, advertiser l can arbitrarily split his budget
into (1 − α)Bl and αBl with α ∈ [0, 1], where the former is invested to engine 1 and the latter to
engine 2. Then there must exist p∗1, p
∗
2 and α
∗ ∈ [0, 1] such that
p∗
2
p∗
1
= ρl.
8To be more exact, we need to guarantee that there are no discontinuous points. Otherwise, the optimal α∗ may
not exist.
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Proof. Denote I1 , {1, 2, . . . , l − 1} and I2 , {l + 1, l + 2, . . . , m}. By previous analysis we know
that advertisers in I1 would always be associated with engine 1 and advertisers in I2 be associated
with engine 2. It remains to be shown the effect of advertiser l’s splitting decision on the price
ratio. Define first that p01 = p
∗
1(I1), p
1
1 = p
∗
1(I1 ∪ {l}) and p
α
1 = p
∗
1(I1 ∪ α{l}) where α{l} denotes
that advertiser l participates in search engine 1, but with fractional budget of αBi; similarly, we
define p02 = p
∗
2(I2), p
1
2 = p
∗
2(I2 ∪ {l}) and p
α
2 = p
∗
2(I2 ∪ α{l}).
To prove that
pα
2
p1−α
1
changes continuously from
p0
2
p1
1
to
p1
2
p0
1
as α increases from zero to one, we first
present lemma 5 as follows.
Lemma 5. Given a monopolistic search engine and the advertisers set I. Assuming all parameters
of the ad system, including engine’s supply, advertisers’ values and budgets, are definite except the
budget Bi of certain advertiser i ∈ I, then the optimal price p
∗(I) can be regarded as a function over
the variable Bi ≥ 0. Furthermore, the function is continuous and non-decreasing as Bi increases.
Proof. Since from algorithm 1, for each realization of Bi, we can compute a definite value of optimal
price, the optimal price can therefore be regarded as a function of Bi.
The property of non-decreasing (or weakly increasing) is easy to see by contradiction. Assuming
for Bi the optimal price is p1 and for Bi + δ (δ > 0) the optimal price is p2 with p2 < p1. Then p1
would be the optimal solution for formulation in (10)-(14) and we let ~q∗ be one of the binding optimal
allocations. After we increase advertiser i’s budget to Bi + δ, the previous solution combination
(p1, ~q∗) would still satisfy the constraints of the revised optimization problem since p1 · q
∗
i ≤ Bi ≤
Bi + δ and all other conditions remain unchanged. Since p2 is the optimal solution for the revised
problem which maximizes the objective function of p ·S, we have p2 ·S ≥ p1 ·S, thus, p2 ≥ p1. This
contradicts with our previous assumption of p2 < p1.
We now turn to prove the property of continuity. Let p∗(Bi) denote the optimal price under
budget Bi and p
∗(Bi+ε) the optimal price under budget Bi+ε where ε is any small real number. As
shown in figure 2, for arbitrary budget Bi ∈ [0,∞), there exist two different scenarios for computing
the optimal price: (a) all advertisers are determined; (b) there is one undetermined advertiser. We
will discuss these two cases separately as follows.
Case (a): vl < p
∗ < vl+1, l ∈ {0, 1, . . . , m − 1} (let v0 = 0). We further consider two cases
for the index of advertiser i whose budget Bi is the variable: (i) i ≤ l; (ii) i > l. For type
(i), since p∗(Bi) = (Bl+1 + Bl+2 + · · · + Bm)/S, the change of Bi would not affect the value of
optimal price, therefore, we have lim
ε→0
p∗(Bi + ε) = p
∗(Bi); For type (ii), since advertiser i is in the
participating set, the change of Bi does affect the optimal price. Assuming ε is small enough such
that |ε| < min{(p∗−vl) ·S, (vl+1−p
∗) ·S}. This condition guarantees that p∗(Bi+ε) = p
∗(Bi)+ε/S
is still in the interval of (vl, vl+1). Therefore, lim
ε→0
p∗(Bi + ε) = p
∗(Bi) + lim
ε→0
ε/S = p∗(Bi).
Case (b): p∗ = vl, l ∈ {1, . . . , m} and Bl+1 + · · · + Bm ≤ vl · S ≤ Bl + Bl+1 + · · · + Bm where
advertiser l would only consume part of his budget under price vl. For i < l, the change of Bi
would not affect p∗, so we only need to consider the case for i ≥ l. We now consider three possible
scenarios for vl · S:
(i) Bl+1 + · · · + Bm < vl · S < Bl + Bl+1 + · · · + Bm. Assuming ε is small enough such that
|ε| < min{vl ·S−(Bl+1+· · ·+Bm), Bl+Bl+1+· · ·+Bm−vl ·S}. This condition guarantees that
after Bi has changed ε, vl ·S is still in the interval of (Bl+1+· · ·+Bm+ε, Bl+Bl+1+· · ·+Bm+ε),
which means that lim
ε→0
p∗(Bi + ε) = lim
ε→0
vl = vl = p
∗(Bi);
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(ii) vl · S = Bl+1 + · · ·+ Bm. When ε is negative, it will be equivalent to the above case (i) and
therefore we have lim
ε→0−
p∗(Bi + ε) = lim
ε→0−
vl = p
∗(Bi); when ε is positive, it will be equivalent
to case (a) and therefore lim
ε→0+
p∗(Bi + ε) = p
∗(Bi) + lim
ε→0+
ε/S = p∗(Bi);
(iii) vl ·S = Bl+Bl+1+ · · ·+Bm. When ε is negative, it will be equivalent to case (a) and therefore
lim
ε→0−
p∗(Bi + ε) = p
∗(Bi) + lim
ε→0−
ε/S = p∗(Bi); when ε is positive, it will be equivalent to the
above case (i) and therefore we have lim
ε→0+
p∗(Bi + ε) = lim
ε→0+
vl = p
∗(Bi).
Therefore now we can conclude that for any Bi ∈ [0,∞), it always holds that lim
ε→0
p∗(Bi + ε) =
p∗(Bi). So p
∗(Bi) is a continuous function over Bi ∈ [0,∞).
From lemma 5 we see that pα2 is continuous and weakly increasing function of α and p
1−α
1 is
continuous and weakly decreasing function of α, thus the price ratio
pα
2
p1−α
1
is continuous and weakly
increasing from
p02
p1
1
to
p12
p0
1
as α rises from zero to one. Thus there must exist an optimal α∗ ∈ [0, 1]
such that
pα
∗
2
p1−α
∗
1
= ρl ∈ (
p0
2
p1
1
,
p1
2
p0
1
).
4.3 Comparison of Competition and Monopoly
After showing the existence of Nash equilibrium prices under a relaxed assumption, we can apply
this NE outcome to predict the revenue and social welfare in the duopoly environment, and com-
pare them with the corresponding results when one search engine monopolize the market. These
comparative results would be instructive in practice considering the attempt of cooperation among
large search companies such as Google and Yahoo!.9
We now turn to compare the prices under competition and monopoly. The main results are
given in the following theorem.
Theorem 3. The equilibrium price in search engine 1 (or engine 2) under competition is no less
(or larger) than the optimal price when engine 1 monopolizes the market.
Proof. Assuming all discount factors are randomly drawn in the range of (ρ, ρ). According to
equation (1) and proposition 1, the monopoly price p∗ satisfies the following condition:
p∗ · S = m · E(B) · [1− F (p∗)] (21)
Now we divide the total supply arbitrarily into S1 = αS and S2 = (1−α)S, α ∈ [0, 1] for search
engine 1 and 2. Suppose the optimal prices are p1 and p2 respectively and there are m1 advertisers
attracted by engine 1 and m2 advertisers by engine 2 where m1 +m2 = m, by applying equation
(1) and proposition 1 we get the following equations for both search engines,
p1 · αS = m1 · E(B) · [1− F (p1)] (22)
p2 · (1− α)S =
∑
i∈I2
E(B) · Prob{ρivi > p2} (23)
9In June 2008, Google and Yahoo! announced an advertising cooperation agreement which was later on forced to
be abandoned due to antitrust concern of government regulators. See the article “Antitrust Concerns Kill Yahoo-
Google Ad Deal,” CNET, November 5, 2008 (http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-10082800-93.html).
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since in equilibrium p2/p1 = ν
∗ and for each advertiser i ∈ I2 it holds that ρi ≥ ν
∗, we can
derive that:
Prob{ρivi > p2} = Prob{ρivi > ν
∗p1} ≥ Prob{vi > p1} = 1− F (p1)
Now the equation (23) would become:
ν∗(1− α) · p1S ≥ m2 · E(B) · [1− F (p1)] (24)
Summing over conditions (22) and (24), we have
[α + ν∗(1− α)] · p1S ≥ m · E(B) · [1− F (p1)] (25)
Since ν∗ ≤ 1, we have α + ν∗(1− α) ≤ α + (1− α) = 1. Defining the following function first,
h(p) ,
1− F (p)
p
which is strictly decreasing over p. Then by comparing conditions (21) and (25), we get
h(p1) ≤
[α + ν∗(1− α)] · S
m ·E(B)
≤
S
m · E(B)
= h(p∗)
we can infer that p1 ≥ p
∗.
Since from proposition 4 we have p1 ≥ p2 and 1− F (p) is a monotonic decreasing function of p,
equation (22) would become:
p2 · αS ≤ p1 · αS ≤ m1 · E(B) · [1− F (p2)] (26)
And since ρi ≤ 1 for any i ∈ I2, we know that:
Prob{ρivi > p2} ≤ Prob{vi > p2} = 1− F (p2)
thus equation (23) would become:
p2 · (1− α)S ≤ m2 · E(B) · [1− F (p2)] (27)
Summing over inequalities (26) and (27), we get
p2S ≤ m · E(B) · [1− F (p2)]
So we have:
h(p2) ≥
S
m · E(B)
= h(p∗)
which infers that p2 ≤ p
∗.
So in general, we have that p2 ≤ p
∗ ≤ p1.
One natural question to the duopoly market is that whether the company acting as a follower
would merge with the leading company in the market. To answer it, we follow the conventional
way of analyzing the total revenue and social welfare under competition and monopoly. At first
glance, it seems that allowing the search engine with better technology to monopolize the market
would generate higher total revenue and social welfare since it can provide better service for both
advertisers and end users. However, it turns out the answer depends on the specific parameters
of participants in the market. We summarize the comparison results of total revenue and social
welfare under competition and monopoly in the following theorem.
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Theorem 4. Whether monopoly would bring in higher total revenue and social welfare than com-
petition depends on the specific parameters of advertisers in the advertising systems.
We can prove this theorem by constructing the counter-examples 2 and 3 as follows.
Example 2. Suppose there are two advertisers {1, 2} participating in the advertising system. The
value, budget and discount factor of each advertiser are as follows: v1 = 1, B1 = 2, ρ1 = 1 and
v2 = 4, B2 = 2, ρ2 = 0. The total supply of advertising opportunity is S = 1.
Under monopoly, the optimal price p∗ = 2 and the maximal revenue is R(p∗) = p∗ · S = 2. For
any p < p∗, the corresponding revenue would be R(p) = p · S < p∗ · S = 2; for any p > p∗, since
v1 < p which means advertiser 1 would not attend the system, R(p) is upper bounded by the budget
of advertiser 2, i.e., R(p) ≤ B2 = 2. This analysis proves the optimality of p
∗ and R(p∗).
Under competition, advertiser 1 would choose engine 2 since ρ1 = 1 and advertiser 2 would
choose the other engine since ρ2 = 0. We equally divide the supply into two parts: S1 = S2 = 0.5.
Now in engine 1, the optimal price is p1 = 4 and R1 = p1 · S1 = 2; in engine 2, the optimal price is
p2 = 1 and R2 = p2 · S2 = 0.5. And the price ratio p2/p1 = 0.25 is less than ρ1 and greater than ρ2.
Therefore in this example, the competition would bring in even higher total revenue (R1+R2 =
2.5) than the monopoly (R(p∗) = 2).
Example 3. There are still two advertisers in the system, with the following parameters: v1 = 2,
B1 = 0.75, ρ1 = 0 and v2 = 4, B2 = 0.25, ρ2 = 1. The total supply of advertising opportunity is
still S = 1.
Under monopoly, the optimal price p∗ = 1 and the allocation vector is (q1, q2) = (0.75, 0.25).
Thus the social welfare would be SW = v1q1 + v2q2 = 2.5.
Under competition, advertiser 1 would choose engine 1 since ρ1 = 0 and advertiser 2 would
choose the other engine since ρ2 = 1. We still divide the supply into S1 = S2 = 0.5. Now in engine
1, the optimal price is p1 = 1.5 and the social welfare SW1 = v1q1 = v1S1 = 0.75; in engine 2, the
optimal price is p2 = 0.5 and SW2 = v2q2 = v2S2 = 2. And the price ratio p2/p1 = 1/3 is greater
than ρ1 and less than ρ2.
Therefore in this example, the competition would bring in even higher social welfare (SW1 +
SW2 = 2.75) than the monopoly (SW = 2.5).
Theorem 4 shows that there is no common conclusion on whether the existence of an inferior
company (or product) in the market would raise or drive down the social welfare (or total revenue).
Our observation here based on the particular search engine competition model coincides with the
finding in the recent paper [12] that the viability of differentiated services scheme depends on the
specific characteristics of users in the system. The services provided by search engine 1 and engine
2 can be regarded as the 1st and 2nd class services in [12] where the 1st class is usually charged
higher price than the 2nd (analogous to our proposition that pNE1 ≥ p
NE
2 ).
Recall that our conclusions above are based on the ex post perspective which includes all possible
instances of the competitive market. To show the more general ex ante results under common
parameter setting of participants, we conduct the simulation in the next section.
5 Simulation Results and Observations
In this section we present some simulation results showing the effects of different parameters in our
model. There are four major criteria we would like to explore in the model:
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(a.1) Prices : We would like to compare the equilibrium prices of both engines with the monopoly
price if there is only one search engine dominates the market. In the following section we
denote (p1, p2) as the duopoly prices and pM as the monopoly price.
(a.2) Revenues : It would be intriguing to study the comparative results of total revenues under
competition and monopoly. The gap between revenues under competition and monopoly
would serve as a signal of whether the leading company would like to propose a merger
or acquisition to its competitor. A huge gap would infer that reaching certain cooperation
agreement between the two competitors would significantly promote the revenues for both
companies.
(a.3) Aggregate Utility of Advertisers : We compare the aggregate utility of advertisers to see
whether monopoly would be detrimental to the interest of advertisers, and if so, how se-
vere the loss would be. In particular, we examine the aggregate utility for brand advertisers
who benefits from the relatively lower price of the inferior search engine in the duopoly market.
(a.4) Social Welfare: Social welfare can be regarded as the realized value of advertisers and is the
benchmark for addressing the interest of the community as a whole. Under competition, the
social welfare is computed according to the following equation:
SW =
∑
i∈I1
viqi +
∑
i∈I2
ρiviqi. (28)
where qi is amount of supply allocated to advertiser i.
In the following, we carry out a set of simulation to investigate the comparative results under
different parameter settings. For each simulation setting, we randomly generate 5000 instances of
parameters and calculate the average value of each criterion. The expected values from ex ante
perspective can then be approximated by the average values of large amounts of ex post instances.
(1). Baseline Setting:
We consider two search engines equally dividing the market and the total supply is normalized
to unity. Thus the supply of either search engine is S1 = S2 = 0.5. Advertisers’ values are
uniformly distributed over (18, 20), and their budgets are also drawn from uniform distribution
with expectation E(B) = 4. Discount factors of advertisers are uniformly distributed over (0.5, 0.9).
Therefore there would be expectedly one half of advertisers with discount factors larger than the
average value E(ρ) = 0.7, which we define as the brand advertisers.
The simulation results under baseline setting are presented in figure 6. We can make the following
observations from figure 6(a)-(d):
1) As the number of advertisers increases, the prices, revenues and social welfare would all get raised
except the aggregate utility of advertisers. This is because as more advertisers participate, the
demand for the limited supply would get boosted, which would finally drive up the unit price
per supply and raise the revenue of search engines. As the price rises, the utility of advertisers
would keep decreasing as seen in figure 6(c). The social welfare can still be improved since when
more advertisers appears, only those advertisers with higher values can stay and be allocated
with certain amount of supply. Thus the realized values of advertisers would be larger and the
social welfare get enhanced.
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Figure 6: Baseline Setting
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2) After the number of advertisers reaches about five, the growth of prices and revenues seems
saturated: more advertisers would not bring evident enhancement in prices and revenues. This
can be derived from our parameter setting: E(B)/E(v) = 4/19 ≈ 0.2 is the approximate
amount of demand for each advertiser, and since the total supply is one, in expectation it would
be sufficient for five advertisers to consume all the supply.
3) Figure 6(a) corresponds with theorem 3 that the monopoly price is smaller than the duopoly
price p1 of engine 1 and larger than price p2 of engine 2. We further notice that the monopoly
price is actually very close to p1 but p2 is much smaller than p1. This is because the monopoly
engine and engine 1 in competition face advertisers with the same distribution of values. Recall
that value is the maximal willingness to pay for advertisers, thus when there are too many
advertisers competing with each other, the price would approach the maximal possible value,
which is 20 according to the distribution range. However, for search engine 2, the actual values
of advertisers are the original values discounted by ρ. The lower ρ is, the larger the gap between
p1 and p2 would be.
4) Figure 6(b) shows that revenue of search engine 1 is larger than that of engine 2. This can be
easily deducted since the revenue of each engine is R1 = p1 ·S1, R2 = p2 ·S2 and we have p1 > p2,
S1 = S2. As we have mentioned, the monopoly price pM is approximately equal to p1. Therefore
the monopoly revenue can be denoted as follows:
RM = pM · S ≈ p1 · S = p1 · S1 + p1 · S2
= R1 +
p1
p2
R2 = R1 +
R2
ρ∗
> R1 +R2 (29)
where ρ∗ is the discount factor of the indifferent advertisers which is always less than one. This
inequality explains the gap between total revenue under competition and monopoly in figure
6(b).
5) The utility of advertisers depends on two factors: the value and the price. Compared with the
monopoly, under competition a portion of advertisers could enjoy a relatively lower price which
would result in higher utility; at the same time, due to the effect of ρ, the values of advertisers in
engine 2 get discounted which would cause lower utility. When the positive factor of lower price
dominate the negative factor of lower value, the utility under competition would be greater and
vice versa. Since in our baseline setting we set a relatively large ρ, the negative factor would
be small and advertisers in engine 2 can benefit from the lower price. This conjecture can be
verified in figure 6(c). Since in average brand advertisers account for half of all advertisers, in
monopoly the utility of brand advertisers is always half of the utility of all advertisers as shown
in figure 6(c). However, under competition the brand advertisers would benefit more than the
rest advertisers since they have higher discount factors which means lower negative effect on
values but confronting a lower price in engine 2.
6) Figure 6(d) indicates that the social welfare under competition is lower than that under monopoly
since the realized values in equation (28) get discounted due to the factor ρ.
(2). Effect of Supplies
We now change the supplies to S1 = 0.9 and S2 = 0.1 while all other parameters remain the
same. The simulation results are presented in figure 7.
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In this setting one search engine plays the leading role in the market and the follower can only
take a small fraction of market share. This assumption is more realistic considering the current
dominant position of Google in most areas of the world.10 Figure 7(a) shows little difference with
the corresponding price curves in figure 6(a) since all prices approach the maximal possible value
when there are sufficient number of advertisers in the market. Since the supply of engine 2 decreases,
the revenue of engine 2 which is denoted by R2 = p2 · S2 would also drop. According to equation
(29), the gap of the total revenues is RM − (R1 + R2) ≈ (
1
ρ∗
− 1)R2. Therefore when R2 is small,
the gap would also be negligible. This is verified by figure 7(b). This result also demonstrates
that even when the follower takes a small portion of market share and provides service of relatively
lower quality, it can still make nontrivial profit through competition and survive in the market.
In figure 7(c), the gain of aggregate utility under competition is tiny compared with that under
monopoly since engine 2 can only provide limited supply (10% of the total supply) and only very
few of advertisers can take advantage of it. Figure 7(d) shows that the loss of social welfare under
competition is very small since only 10% of the total supply is of lower quality, i.e., the second term
in equation (28) is insignificant.
(3). Effect of Discount Factors
We now turn to investigate the effect of technology gap between two search engines. Let the
discount factors be drawn uniformly on (0.1, 0.5) and all other parameters are the same as the
baseline setting.
As figure 8(a) shows, the equilibrium price p1 of engine 1 and the monopoly price pM are still
close to the maximal value of advertisers and p2 approaches the maximal discounted value ρv. As
ρ decreases, the price of engine 2 also diminishes compared with p2 in figure 6(a) and 7(a).
Since the revenue R = p · S and from above analysis we know p1 has little change and p2
diminishes, the revenue R1 of engine 1 would stay almost the same while R2 reduces as shown in
figure 8(b). Since we have also mentioned that the gap between the total revenues approximates to
RM − (R1 + R2) ≈ (
1
ρ∗
− 1)R2, when ρ is small, the gap would become larger. This can be easily
seen by comparing the corresponding revenue curves in figure 6(b) and figure 8(b).
The aggregate utilities of advertisers in monopoly are the same in figure 6(c) and figure 8(c);
however, the aggregate utilities under competition in figure 8(c) is much smaller than those in
figure 6(c) due to the negative effect of ρ on advertisers’ values. In figure 8(c) we see that there
is certain intersection between utility under competition and monopoly. When there are only a
few of advertisers, the prices are still low and the main factor affecting utility is the value. Under
competition the existence of ρ would drive down advertisers’ values and thereby results in lower
aggregate utility. As the number of advertisers increases, the monopoly price pM would approach
the maximal value vmax = 20 and the aggregate utility would gradually reduce to zero. However,
even when p1 and pM approach 20, the rest of advertisers whose discount factors are larger than the
equilibrium price ratio ρ∗ = p2/p1 can still obtain nontrivial utility which can be approximated as
(ρ¯v − p2)S2 ≈ (ρ¯v − ρ
∗v)S2 (ρ¯ denotes the average value of advertisers with discount factors larger
than the price ratio ρ∗).
10In the United States around 72 percent of the total search volumes are conducted on Google while Ya-
hoo and Bing jointly account for about 25 percent. Source from “Top 20 Sites & Engines,” Hitwise, May
20, 2010 (http://www.hitwise.com/us/datacenter/main/dashboard-10133.html). In some other countries like
France, UK and Germany, Google even possessed a market share of over 90 percent. Source from the arti-
cle “Google’s Market Share in Your Country,” March 13, 2009 (http://googlesystem.blogspot.com/2009/03/
googles-market-share-in-your-country.html).
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Figure 7: When Supplies Change To S1 : S2 = 9 : 1
Figure 8(d) displays the hug gap between social welfare under competition and monopoly. Since
half of the supply (S2 = 0.5) is allocated to advertisers with discount factors less than 0.5, the real-
ized values in equation (28) would become significantly smaller than social welfare under monopoly.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
We propose an analytical framework to model the interaction of publishers, advertisers and users
under monopoly and duopoly scenarios. For monopoly market, we can give the analytical results
of price and revenue for both ex ante and ex post case. For duopoly market, we formulate a three-
stage dynamic game to model the search engines’ competition for both users and advertisers and
prove the existence of Nash equilibrium from ex post perspective. To see the long-term effect of
competition from ex ante perspective, we carry out computer simulations for different settings of
participants’ parameters. The comparative results of revenues and social welfare under competition
and monopoly are then presented and discussed extensively in the paper. Our analysis could provide
some insight in regulating the search engine market and protecting the interests of advertisers and
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Figure 8: When ρ Belongs to (0.1, 0.5)
end users. Although the cooperation between search engines can probably bring more total revenues,
advertisers and users may be averse to such plan which eliminates their freedom to choose from
diverse services provided by different search companies.
There are several possible ways to extend our work. Throughout our paper, we implicitly assume
that advertisers would reveal their true parameters such as values and budgets to the search engines.
Since our framework is by no means strategy-proof, how would rational advertisers’ strategies affect
our conclusions would be an interesting question for further investigation. Another non-trivial
problem is how to associate our analytical result of revenue from one particular keyword with the
practical revenue of an industrial search company which gathers from numerous keywords queried
by end users everyday. Besides, to be in line with the practical advertising system nowadays, we will
consider incorporating the quality factor of advertisement for the revenue-ranking rule as well as the
generalized second-price auction prevailing in major search engines. Finally, it would be intriguing
to extend our model for multiple search engines scenario besides the basic duopoly scenario.
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